Software Rejuvenation for Secure Tracking Control by Romagnoli, Raffaele et al.
Software Rejuvenation for Secure Tracking Control
Raffaele Romagnoli†, Bruce H. Krogh‡, Dionisio de Niz‡ and Bruno Sinopoli†
†Dept.of Electrical and Computer Engineering
‡Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA USA
{rromagno|dionisio|krogh|brunos}@andrew.cmu.edu
Abstract— Software rejuvenation protects cyber-physical sys-
tems (CSPs) against cyber attacks on the run-time code by
periodically refreshing the system with an uncorrupted software
image. The system is vulnerable to attacks when it is commu-
nicating with other agents. Security is guaranteed during the
software refresh and re-initialization by turning off all com-
munication. Although the effectiveness of software rejuvenation
has been demonstrated for some simple systems, many problems
need to be addressed to make it viable for real applications.
This paper expands the scope of CPS applications for which
software rejuvenation can be implemented by introducing
architectural and algorithmic features to support trajectory
tracking. Following each software refresh, while communication
is still off, a safety controller is executed to assure the system
state is within a sufficiently small neighborhood of the current
point on the reference trajectory. Communication is then re-
established and the reference trajectory tracking control is
resumed. A protected, verified hypervisor manages the software
rejuvenation sequence and delivers trusted reference trajectory
points, which may be received from untrusted communication,
but are verified using an authentication process. We present the
approach to designing the tracking and safety controllers and
timing parameters and demonstrate the secure tracking control
for a 6 DOF quadrotor using the PX4 jMAVSim quadrotor sim-
ulator. The concluding section discusses directions for further
research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software rejuvenation, an established method to improve
the robustness against software faults in traditional comput-
ing systems [1], has been proposed recently to deal with
unmodeled and undetectable cyber attacks on cyber-physical
systems (CPSs) [2], [3]. The idea is to periodically refresh
the run-time system completely with a trusted, secure copy of
the control software to thwart attacks that may have changed
the on-line code. Although the basic concept has been imple-
mented for some demonstration systems, applications have
been limited to cases where all of the information required
for control is available a priori so that it can be reloaded with
each software refresh. This paper presents an architecture and
algorithms to support secure tracking control using software
rejuvenation when the reference trajectory points are being
updated from possibly insecure communication throughout
the execution of the mission.
The concept of software rejuvenation was introduced by
Huang et al. in 1995 [4] to address the problem of so-
called software aging; that is, failures that occur when a
running program encounters a state that was not anticipated
when the software was designed. The basic idea is to
restart the software intermittently at a "clean" state, either
through complete system reboot or by returning to a recent
checkpoint, with the hope that this will prolong the time until
unanticipated states occur that might cause failures. Since
the introduction of the concept, there has been considerable
research into the development and performance of software
rejuvenation strategies [5], and it has become a practical tool
for enhancing the robustness of many computing systems [1].
Although software aging remains the primary motiva-
tion for implementing software rejuvenation strategies in
computing systems, a few papers have proposed software
rejuvenation to enhance system security [6], [7]. In contrast
to software aging where mean-time to failure can be the basis
for timing software refresh, the frequency of software refresh
to defend against malicious attacks must be determined by
the length of time a system can remain viable once its
security has been violated.
Arroyo et al. [2], [3] propose software rejuvenation as a
strategy for CPS security and demonstrated the concept for
a quadrotor controller and an automotive engine controller.
These examples illustrate how refreshing software in a CPS
impacts performance and introduces timing constraints and
safety considerations that are not present in traditional com-
puting systems.
Abidi et al. [8] develop software rejuvenation for CPS
further by introducing three concepts. First, the hardware
root of trust is a secure onboard module that hosts the
capabilities that must be available without compromise to
implement software rejuvenation. Second, the secure exe-
cution interval (SEI) is a period during which all external
communication is disabled so that no cyber attacks can occur
as the software is refreshed. Third, the safety controller,
which executes immediately following a software refresh
and during the SEI, drives the CPS to a known safe state
before restoring communication and returning the system to
mission control with vulnerability to attacks. Abidi et al. use
a simple, conservative reachability algorithm to determine
the time that can be allowed before the next software reset
and illustrate their approach for a simulated warehouse
temperature controller and a bench-top 3-DOF helicopter.
In this paper, we adopt the overall approach to software
rejuvenation from [8], but modify the timing strategy based
on analysis of the control problem. We also use the concept
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of a secure, trusted hypervisor introduced by Vasudevand et
al. [9], rather than separate hardware, to provide the required
secure computing components. We formulate the software
rejuvenation problem for tracking control applications, which
arise in many CPS applications. Using invariant sets to de-
sign the safety controller, an event-based algorithm to switch
reference points for the tracking controller, and data authen-
tication to manage reference points received from possibly
compromised communication, we demonstrate how software
rejuvenation can be used to achieve provable operational
safety and robustness against cyber attacks that take over
the system control by changing the run-time software. We
illustrate our contributions using simulation of the nonlinear
dynamics for a 6-DOF quadrotor.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the standard architecture of hierarchical tracking control
systems and the event-based method for switching points to
be tracked along a reference trajectory. Section III presents
the design of safety controllers and timing for software reju-
venation based on invariant sets. Tracking control and safety
control are combined in Sec. IV to implement the software
rejuvenation algorithm using the hypervisor architecture. The
concepts are applied in Sec. V to implement a secure tracking
control system for a 6 DOF drone and simulation results
illustrate the tracking control performance when the system
is subjected to a cyber attack. An appendix provides the
mathematical details for the drone control application. The
concluding section discusses directions for further research
and development.
II. TRACKING CONTROL
CPSs that perform missions involving motion are typi-
cally operated using a hierarchical control architecture, as
illustrated in Fig. 1. A mission controller defines a sequence
of waypoints to be visited. A reference generator produces a
sequence of points called the reference trajectory to take the
CPS from waypoint to waypoint along a safe and feasible
path. Motion along the reference trajectory is executed by
a tracking controller that generates the commands to the
system actuators. Depending on the application, the mission
controller and reference governor may be onboard or off-
board, but the trajectory controller usually needs to be
onboard to satisfy the real-time constraints for executing the
trajectory. This paper focuses on the implementation of the
tracking controller.
The tracking controller is typically implemented as a
regulator that will drive the system to a given set point, and
motion is accomplished by switching along the points on
the reference trajectory. Since it is not necessary to actually
stop at the points on the reference trajectory, the switching
from the current reference point to the next reference point
can be implemented using a time-based or event-based
scheme. In time-based schemes, the points on the reference
trajectory have time stamps and the reference point for the
tracking controller is updated as time evolves. In event-based
schemes, the reference point for the tracking controller is
updated when the system is within a given neighborhood
reference 
generator
tracking
control
actuators
system dynamics
sensors
trajectory execution
onboard
waypoints
reference trajectory
mission 
control
possibly off‐board
Fig. 1: Hierarchical tracking control systems.
of the current reference point. The secure tracking control
proposed in this paper uses the following event-based scheme
to update the reference points for the trajectory controller.
We assume the reference points along the reference tra-
jectory are equilibrium states for the system. Let xn denote
the current equilibrium reference point and suppose that a
feedback control law is implemented to drive the state of
the system to xn and stabilize it at that equilibrium set.
If xn is not the final point in the reference trajectory (the
final waypoint), the reference point can be updated to the
next reference point, denoted by xn+1 before xn is reached.
The condition for switching the reference point to xn+1 is
defined by a region about the current reference point, denoted
by ETC(xn). Figure 2 illustrates this event-based rule for
updating the reference point for tracking control.
x
n
xn‐1
xn+1ETC (x
n‐1)
ETC (xn)
ETC (xn+1)
switch to xn
switch to xn+1
switch to xn+2
Fig. 2: Event-based reference point update for tracking
control.
III. SAFETY CONTROL
This section describes the safety controller that plays a
key role in achieving secure tracking control using software
rejuvenation. The safety controller is designed to guarantee
the state of the system remains within a safe neighborhood
of the current equilibrium point being used as the reference
point by the tracking controller, even if there is a cyber
attack. Let xeq denote the current equilibrium point for
tracking control, which we will refer to as normal control
in this section. The safe neighborhood of xeq , denoted by
EC(xeq), is a set of states satisfying the operating constraints
as well as the range of states around xeq for which the safety
controller is guaranteed to work properly.
During normal control, the system is vulnerable to cyber
attacks, which means that the run-time code may be modified
and the control actions can drive the system away from xeq .
The controller is also disabled during a software refresh,
which is performed before safety control can be executed. We
call this period of normal control followed by the software
refresh the period of uncertain control, with the duration
denoted by TUC .
To assure the state of the system does not exit EC(xeq)
during the period TUC , it must be guaranteed the state is in a
sufficiently small neighborhood of xeq before normal control
(and vulnerability to attacks) is initiated such that the state
trajectory cannot be driven out of EC(xeq) with any control
action available to an attacker. We let ESC(xeq) denote this
smaller neighborhood of xeq , and note that EC(xeq) must
satisfy one additional condition. That is, if safety control
is initiated when the system is at any state in EC(xeq),
it must be the case that under safety control, the system
is taken to ESC(xeq) in finite time along a trajectory that
does not leave EC(xeq). Moreover, the safety controller must
keep the state trajectory in ESC(xeq) once it has entered
ESC(xeq). In control terminology, it is necessary for EC(xeq)
and ESC(xeq) to be invariant under safety control.
The requirements for EC(xeq) and ESC(xeq) ⊂ EC(xeq)
are summarized by the following technical conditions:
i R(EC(xeq), t;SC) ⊆ EC(xeq) ∀ t > 0, where
R(EC(xeq), t;SC) is the set of states reached at time
t applying safety control (SC) starting at time t = 0
from any state in EC(xeq);1
ii ∃ T¯SC > 0 3 R(EC(xeq), t;SC) ⊆ ESC(xeq) ∀ t ≥
T¯SC ; and
iii ∃ TUC > 0 3 R(ESC(xeq), t;U) ⊆ EC(xeq) ∀ t <
TUC .
Figure 3 illustrates the definitions and conditions described
above. Section V presents methods for finding EC(xeq),
ESC(xeq) and TUC for a drone control application.
IV. SOFTWARE REJUVENATION FOR TRACKING
CONTROL
This section describes the architecture and the algorithm to
achieve secure tracking control using software rejuvenation
using the tracking controller and safety controller described
in the previous sections.
Figure 4 presents the system architecture. The onboard
processor has two partitions, trusted and untrusted. The
1We assume the system dynamics are time-invariant.
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Fig. 3: Safety control: initiated after the period TUC since the
last initiation of normal control; executed until the state is
in ESC(xeq), before returning the system to normal control.
trusted partition has protected memory and services that can-
not be accessed by any processes in the untrusted partition.
It hosts the software image that will refresh the run-time
code and memory in the untrusted partition. It also hosts a
verified, trusted hypervisor [9], which manages the software
rejuvenation cycle, initiates and terminates processes in the
untrusted partition, authenticates reference points for the
tracking controller, and processes control commands from
the controllers to be delivered to the actuators (explained
below). The hypervisor uses a limited, verified set of OS
services that are also hosted in the trusted partition.
The untrusted partition hosts the safety and tracking
controllers, the operating system and any other functions
required to operate the system. This partition is untrusted
because it is too complex to be verified formally and it
receives communication from other agents, which includes
sensors and off-board agents. It is this communication, which
is necessary for the system to execute its missions, which
makes the system vulnerable to cyber attacks. As shown in
Fig. 4, although reference points may be received from the
communication, they are not used directly by the controllers.
The received reference points are passed to the hypervisor
for authentication and the hypervisor manages the reference
point update, as described below.
Figure 5 details the timing for the software rejuvenation
cycle and the communication between the trusted and un-
trusted partitions. Before a software refresh, the hypervi-
sor turns off the communication to the untrusted partition,
making it invulnerable to cyber attacks. The communication
remains off through the execution of the safety control, which
follows immediately after the software refresh. As indicated
in the figure, the safety control executes until the state has
been driven into ESC for the current reference point. A timer
is set and tracking control is then initiated by the hypervisor,
which provides the reference point to the tracking controller.
Any new reference points received during tracking control
are passed to the hypervisor for authentication. Tracking
control is terminated either when the state reaches ETC for
the current reference point or the timer times out after the
timer period tr (only the timeout case is shown in Fig. 5).
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Fig. 4: System architecture to support secure software rejuvenation for tracking control.
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Fig. 5: Software rejuvenation control modes.
Communication is then turned off and software refresh is
executed again. The software refresh takes a known amount
of time, TSR, so by choosing tr ≤ TUC − TSR, it is
guaranteed the state is in EC when the safety control is
initiated, as indicated in the figure.
The hypervisor uses algorithm 1 to update the reference
points for the controllers.2
As is illustrated in the following section, it is useful to
constrain the control actions that can be taken during tracking
control so that any attacks during this period are subjected to
constraints that limit the rate at which an attacker might drive
the system from ESC to the boundary of EC . Enforcing such
limits increases TUC . These limits can be imposed by passing
all controls through the hypervisor. On the other hand, the
full control capability is available to the safety controller,
which helps to minimize any time required for safety control
actions. Figure 6 illustrates this processing performed by the
hypervisor to communicate the controls from the controllers
to the actuators. Note that the hypervisor is a relatively small
process that is fully verified, so it is only able to impose
2Algorithm 1 shows only the functions of the hypervisor relevant to
reference point management.
limits on the control signals.
V. APPLICATION: DRONE CONTROL
This section shows the application of the proposed soft-
ware rejuvenation for secure tracking control for a 6-DOF
Quadrotor (or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)) system.
Specificall,y a Generic 10" Quadrotor + geometry airframe
[10] with full thrust of 4 N, and full torque of 0.05 Nm
for each motor is considered. The simulation are performed
with the jMAVSim flight simulator. A 6-DOF quadrotor is
a nonlinear system described by a 12-dimensional state-
space model that contains position, orientation and linear and
angular velocities of the UAV. [11]. There are four controls:
the normal force to the airframe and three torques related
to the orientation angles of the UAV. The bounds on the
controls are: the max total force normal to the air frame is
16N, the max torque related to the roll and pitch angles is
±0.66 Nm, and ±0.1 Nm for the yaw. Those controls are
mapped by a matrix multiplication ("mixer") to the actuator
signals for the four motors. Each signal is normalized with
respect to the maximal power that can be generated by each
motor.
control‐to‐
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controls
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Fig. 6: Hypervisor control signal processing.
The UAV is stabilized by an LQR controller designed
considering the linearized model of the system around an
equilibrium point xeq , that without loss of generality can be
considered the origin of the state space [12],[13],[14]. See
the appendix for the details of the computations discussed in
the following subsections.
A. Safety Controller
The safety controller is the LQR controller described in
the Appendix, using Q = 50·I12 and R = 100·I12 where I12
is the identity matrix. The safe set C is a convex polyhedral
subset of the state space R12 which imposes the following
constraints on:
• the position: ±2.5 m along z (vertical direction), and
±1 m along x and y (horizontal direction);
• the orientation: the roll φ, pitch θ and yaw ψ angles are
bounded between ±pi/4;
• the linear velocities: ±5 m/s for the vertical and ±2 m/s
for the horizontal directions;
• the angular velocities: ±5 rad/s for all the angles.
Writing the above set of constraints as in (6), and solving
the maximization problem (8), the safe set EC(xeq) is the
maximum volume ellipsoid contained in (6) with the sym-
metric matrix P > 0.
The computation of the overapproximation of the reach-
able set R+(CSC(xeq), TUC ,U) (16), for the verification of
the admissible values of SC and TUC requires U which is,
in this case, a polytopic set generated by:
1) the bound on the torques related to the pitch and roll
angles is ±0.0033 Nm, for yaw is ±0.0005 Nm.
2) the bound on the max total force is 14 N, and the lowest
admissible value in case of a sudden shut down of the
propellers is 2 N.
Figures 7 and 8 show the sets EC , ESC and
R+(CSC(xeq), TUC ,U) projected in the space of the
position, orientation, linear and angular velocities for
SC = 0.05 and TUC = 0.18s. In all four projections
R+(CSC(xeq), TUC ,U) ⊆ EC(xeq). In fact, the safe set
EC(xeq) contains all the vertexes of R+(CSC(xeq), TUC ,U).
It is important to note that, despite the conservative effects
due to the bounds on the torques on the reachable set of
the angular velocities (Fig. 8- right), linear velocities (Fig.
8- left) and angles (Fig. 7- right) have the vertexes of their
reachable sets close to the border of EC(xeq).
B. Tracking Control
The goal of the tracking control is to follow a sequence of
equilibrium points xeq to drive the system from a specified
initial point to a specified final point (the two waypoints). For
the quadrotor, an equilibrium point corresponds to hovering
at a certain altitude, with zero roll pitch angles, and a
given value of yaw. All the velocities are zero. A constant
feedforward input is added to the controls in order to provide
a sufficient normal force that compensates the effect of the
g-force. In this case that value is 7.848 N.
The mechanism generating the sequence of equilib-
rium points by the tracking control scheme depends on
ETC(xeq) ⊂ ESC(xeq). When the system moves into
ETC(xeq), the tracking controller switches from xeq to the
next one x′eq after the next reboot. This example considers
ETC(xeq) as an ellipsoids described by the matrix P > 0
with TC = 0.01 and micro-reboots of 0.03 s. The mission of
this simulation consists in moving the UAV from the position
(x = 1, y = 0, z = 2, ψ = 0) to (x = 1, y = 2, z = 4, ψ =
0).
C. Simulation
The aim of the simulation is to illustrate the effectiveness
and robustness against attack of the proposed approach. To
illustrate that, an attack that suddenly turns off the propellers
is considered.
Figure 9 describes the overall simulation considering pro-
jecting the position along z. Besides the actual behaviour of
the UAV along z, it shows the equilibrium points updates,
the switches between the several control modes (TC,SR,SC),
and the value of the Lyapunov function V , respect to the
time. Before that the mission starts, the secure control is
forced to run for 2s. After that, the mission control start
to update the equilibrium points (magenta) if the the state
of the system is in ETC(xeq). The equilibrium points pull
the altitude of the UAV towards the final equilibrium point.
The current equilibrium point xeq switches to the next
one x′eq before that the quadrotor gets to xeq . The gray
plot represents the switches between micro-reboots and TC
where the equilibrium points are updated. The attack happens
Algorithm 1 Reference Point Update
1: xstart : given initial reference point
2: Initialize:
3: COMMUNICATION OFF;
4: xcur := xstart : current reference point
5: SOFTWARE REFRESH
6: Initiate Safety Control
7: Send xcur
8: !Receive Safety Control Completed
9: REPEAT
10: COMMUNICATION ON
11: START TIMER with time tr
12: Initiate Tracking Control
13: Send xcur
14: FINISHED := FALSE
15: WHILE NOT FINISHED
16: IF Receive new reference point xnew
17: IF NOT AUTHENTICATE(xnew)
18: xnew := xcur
19: ENDIF
20: IF Receive Tracking Control Completed
21: OR Receive TIMEOUT
22: FINISHED := TRUE
23: ENDIF
24: ENDWHILE
25: COMMUNICATION OFF;
26: SOFTWARE REFRESH
27: Initiate Safety Control
28: Send xcur
29: !Receive Safety Control Completed
30: xcur := xnew
31: END REPEAT
during the period highlighted in red. Since the system is far
away from the current equilibrium point, the reference point
for the tracking controller does not update it until the system
reaches ETC(xeq). The figure also shows the values of the
Lyapunov function that are very small except when the attack
occurs.
Figure (10) illustrates the position and the linear velocities
of the UAV respects to the projection of ESC(xeq) (outer)
and ETC(xeq) (inner) for several equilibrium points. The
projection of xeq is always 0.
The projection of the sets ESC(xeq) and ETC(xeq) in
correspondence of the attach (Fig. 10-left, blue ellipsoid) on
the y − z and plane y˙ − z˙ is illustrated in Fig. 11 . That
figure shows the behavior of the quadrotor during the several
control modes. After the attack (red) and SR (blue), SC is
active because the velocity (right) along z hits ESC(xeq)
while the position is still inside that set (left). Instead, when
the position goes back to ESC(xeq), TC is active again. When
the position hits ESC(xeq), after SR the equilibrium point
switches to x′eq .
VI. DISCUSSION
This paper presents a general method for implementing
software rejuvenation for secure tracking control based on an
event-based reference point update scheme for the tracking
controller and an invariant-based safety controller. An archi-
tecture for the onboard processor is presented that provides
the necessary secure computation components to manage the
software rejuvenation sequence, authentication and update
of the reference points for the tracking controller and the
mapping of the controller outputs to the system actuators.
This extends software rejuvenation to a broader class of CPS
applications.
There are several directions for future research. There are
several design trade-offs to be investigated, including the
trade-offs among the control constraints and sizes of the ref-
erence point neighborhoods used for the tracking and safety
control algorithms, the time allotted to tracking control and
the control limits used during tracking control. Disturbances
and modeling uncertainties also need to be incorporated
into the reachability algorithm used to determine the time
bound on the uncertain control period. The integration of
software rejuvenation with algorithms for attack detection
and mitigation should also be investigated to extend the scope
of security and robustness that can be achieved. Finally, we
are currently moving the algorithm from simulation to a
trusted real-time hypervisor platform for drone control and
plan to report these results in future papers.
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APPENDIX
A. LQR Control
The state space representation of the dynamics of a
continuous-time LTI system is
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), (1)
where x ∈ Rn is the state, and u ∈ Rp is the input.
A linear control that stabilizes (1) is
u(t) = −Kx(t) (2)
where K is computed minimizing the cost function
J =
∫ ∞
0
xT (τ)Qx(τ) + uT (τ)Ru(τ)dτ. (3)
where Q ≥ 0 and R > 0 are symmetric matrices. The
minimum is achieved if
K = R−1BTS (4)
where S is the solution of the associated Riccati algebraic
equation [15]. Controller (2) is a linear quadratic regulator.
B. Safe Control
The associated closed-loop system is
x˙(t) = ASC(x(t)− xeq) (5)
where ASC , A−BK.
Given a convex polyhedral region C ⊂ Rn of the state
space given by
C(xeq) =
{
x | ξTj (x− xeq) ≤ 1, j = 1, ..., nc
}
(6)
the largest positively invariant ellipsoid with respect to the
equilibrium point xeq and associated to (5)
EC(xeq) =
{
x | ‖(x− xeq)‖2P ≤ 1
}
(7)
contained in C can be found solving the following maximiza-
tion problem [16]:
max log detQ¯
s.t. Q¯ATSC +ASCQ¯ ≤ 0
ξTj Q¯ξj ≤ 1, j = 1, ..., nc
Q¯ > 0
(8)
where P = Q¯−1 [16]. Set (7) is a positively invariant set,
since
‖(x− xeq)‖2P = (x− xeq)TP (x− xeq) (9)
is a quadratic Lyapunov function for (5). The set
ESC(xeq) =
{
x | ‖(x− xeq)‖2P ≤ SC
}
(10)
with 0 ≤ SC ≤ 1 is a Lyapunov level-set where
ESC(xeq) ⊆ EC(xeq). From (6) a convex polyhedron
ESC(xeq) ⊆ CSC(xeq) is given by
CSC(xeq) =
{
x | ξTj (x− xeq) ≤
√
SC , j = 1, ..., nc
}
.
(11)
C. Computation of TUC
Given SC , the computation of TUC consists in checking
if the reachable set
R(CSC(xeq), t;U) = {x|eAtx0 +
∫ t
0
eA(t−τ)Bu(τ)dτ, (12)
x0 ∈ CSC(xeq), u(τ) ∈ U , 0 ≤ τ ≤ t}.(13)
is contained in EC(xeq). The reach set (13) is computed
considering any value of input in U given to the system (1),
starting from any point in CSC(xeq).
An approximation of (13) is obtained considering a
method based on the computation of the supporting hyper-
plans for polytopic sets [17]. The supporting hyperplanes to
R(CSC(xeq) are
v+j (x, t) = ξj(t)x, j = 1, ..., nc (14)
where ξj(0) = ξj . Using the maximum principle of the
optimal control [18], the normal direction of ξi is
ξj(t) = e
−AT τξj . (15)
Representing U as convex combination of nu vertexes
u1, ..., unu , the over-approximation of R(CSC(xeq), t,U) is
[19]
R+(CSC(xeq), t,U) =
⋂nc
j=1
{
x|v+j (x, t) ≤∫ t
0
maxi 〈ξj(τ), Bui〉dτ+
maxx(0)∈CSC(§eq) v
+
j (x(0), 0)
}
.(16)
The convex polyhedral set (16) can be also represented as
polytope,
R+(CSC(xeq), t,U) ={
x ∈ Rn | x =
nv∑
k=1
αhxk,
nv∑
k=1
αk = 1 αk ≥ 0
}
(17)
then to check if for a given TUC , R+(CSC(xeq), t,U) ⊆
EC(xeq) it is sufficient to make that check only in corre-
spondence of the verteces xk.
